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The Conditional Probability of Mortgage Default This research examines the implications of contingent claims models for empirical research on default. We focus on the probability of default over a short horizon given the current state of the world, i.e., the conditional probability of default, which more closely resembles the estimates of empirical models. We highlight the differences between the conditional and unconditional approaches and provide guidance for empirical research by illuminating situations where the expected sign reverses over the shorter horizon or where the functional form is highly non-linear.
While the importance of the embedded options in a mortgage contract has been recognized for almost two decades (Findlay and Capozza, 1977; Asay, 1978) , the analysis of default probabilities using contingent claims models is more recent Kim 1993, 1994) . Nevertheless, the link between the theoretical models of default and the empirical tests remains weak. Typically, theoretical models have focused on the unconditional probability of default 1 .
Unconditional probabilities are most suitably tested using data on the cumulative defaults on mortgage loans over the entire thirty year life of the loans. However, empirical work commonly focuses on conditional probabilities over short horizons by using annual default data for seasoned loans.
Conditional probabilities are important for three reasons. First, most empirical work analyzes conditional probabilities. Second, conditional probabilities are essential for pricing mortgage loans; and third, unconditional probabilities can be obtained from the conditional by integration of the state variables.
In this research we explore the conditional probabilities in the context of a contingent claims model. Our primary goal is to provide guidance on functional form and specification of the independent variables for empirical research on default. Our results highlight situations where the importance of some independent variables is greatly diminished or where care must be taken in specifying functional form. The effect of transactions costs and trigger events is also examined in a precise way.
To preview the conclusions, the results show that not only is the relationship between default and several of its determinants highly non-linear, but also the magnitude and even the sign depends on the horizon. We show that some variables, like the volatility of house prices, which are important unconditionally, are not very important conditionally. For other variables, like the current interest rate, interaction terms are essential.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the contingent claims model that is solved by backward induction to determine the optimal stopping boundary. The third section presents and discusses the simulation results and the final section contains the conclusion.
The Model
To capture the competing hazards of prepayment and default, we employ a two factor model. House prices are assumed to follow discrete geometric Brownian motion and interest rates are an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck mean reverting process.
The simulations use monthly time steps so that once each month, just prior to a mortgage payment, the mortgagor decides whether to prepay, default or make the scheduled mortgage payment 2 . We abstract from issues surrounding delinquency or dely by assuming that default results in immediate loss of the house in exchange for forgiveness of the debt 3 .
House Price Process
House prices (H) are assumed to follow the process:
2 In actuality the decision to prepay or default can occur at any time. 3 Ambrose, Buttimer and Capone (1996b) point out that when a borrower decides to technically default by missing scheduled payments, the motivation can be either an attempt to exercise the implicit put option or a decision to use mortgage delinquency to finance other expenditures. Default in the context of our model is a foreclosure and sale by the lender so that delinquency and delay to finance other expenditiures is not modeled.
where g = the required return on housing given its risk, γ = the rental rate or "rent-to-price" ratio for the house, (analogous to the dividend rate on common stock.)
σ H = the volatility of house prices, and W = standard Brownian motion.
Hedging arguments (e.g., Hull 1993) yield the risk neutral pricing process given by
where r = the risk free interest rate, and V = an alternate Brownian motion.
The risk neutralized drift of the house price process depends not on the gross return to housing, but rather on the risk free interest rate. For consistency, the risk neutralized house price process is used when modeling the default decision, however, the original process is used when modeling the probability of default 4 .
Interest Rate Process
Interest rates are also stochastic in the model. Interest rate changes have two influences over default decisions. First, if interest rates rise, default is less likely because the mortgagor values the low cost mortgage and will hesitate surrendering it. Second, if interest rates fall, refinance becomes likely and extinguishes the default option. We assume that interest rates follow a discrete version of the OrnsteinUhlenbeck mean reverting process:
where r = the interest rate, α = the equilibrium interest rate to which rates will tend to return, β = non-negative reversion parameter which describes the intensity at which rates will return to the equilibrium rate, and σ r = the volatility of interest rates.
In equation (3), if β=0, the process is a pure random walk model (normal diffusion). When α=r, the process is a pure random walk over the next instant. For other parameter values, the interest rate tends to α. The term structure of interest rates is implied by the difference between r and α.
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Transactions Costs and Trigger Events
Two "real world" considerations are typically incorporated into contingentclaims mortgage termination models. The first is the transactions costs of default; and the second is "trigger events" or exogenous 6 termination such as job relocation. Transactions costs are incorporated into the default decision by adding a cost term to the outstanding balance at the time of default.
Transaction costs include monetary moving costs, social and family costs of the move, and financial disruption from a blemished credit standing or deficiency judgments that claim other assets. In the simulations that follow, transaction costs are modeled as a fixed dollar cost.
A trigger event converts the multi-period default decision into a one period decision. There are two types of trigger events. The first type arises if the borrower must move. In this case the opportunity or transactions costs of default are minimal since the borrower incurs the costs whether he defaults or not. The second type occurs when the borrowers is unable to continue making payments. In this case the transactions costs remain relevant since a default will necessitate a move that need not occur otherwise 7 .
Correlation between Interest Rates and House Prices
5 Negative interest rates are permitted in this model; but they are not important since the optimal refinance boundary, except when the loan is almost fully repaid, occurs at positive interest rates for realistic parameter values. 6 As Kau, Keenan and Kim (1994) point out, these terminations may be suboptimal from the point of view of the model, but be the optimal decision for the mortgagor who chooses to terminate for reasons exogenous to the model. 7 Ambrose, Buttimer, and Capone (1996a) Capozza, Kazarian, and Thomson (1997) . We were unable to find any R 2 greater than .02 when house prices were regressed on interest rates in various specifications including levels, first differences, real and nominal interest rates, and house prices.
Simulating Empirical Default
Empirical analysis of mortgage default data is usually based on annual data for seasoned loans rather than on newly originated loans. The default rate is computed by dividing the number of loans that default by the number of loans at risk that year. To approximate the empirical default rate in the simulations, we compute the probability that a loan is still alive, i.e., neither prepaid nor defaulted at the beginning of each 12 month period. We then sum the default probabilities for the next 12 months to determine the probability that a default will occur over the next full year. The annual default rate is the probability of default over the next 12 months divided by the probability that the loan was alive, i.e., not prepaid or defaulted, at the beginning of the period.
We initiate the analysis by requiring that the mortgage be fairly priced. The coupon rate on a loan at origination must set the present value of payments 
The Simulations
The model evaluates conditional default probabilities for seasoned mortgages.
The parameters were chosen to be realistic ( e.g., 360 month mortgages), and similar to those used in other studies. Because few defaults occur for houses with low CLTV, we assess default rates for high CLTV loans only. We present results for the stochastic house price process (house price volatility and dividend rate), the interest rate process (level of interest rate, interest rate volatility, interest rate reversion), transaction costs of default and refinance, and the exogenous termination rate. In each figure three panels depict the default rates measured over a 1 year and 10 year horizon for three CLTVs (90%, 100%, 110%). The 10 year horizon is representative of the long-horizon or unconditional probability of default. The 1 year horizon is intended to reflect the conditional default rates found in annual default data.
House Price Volatility
Figure 1 summarizes the effect of house price volatility on defaults. There is a sign reversal at high CLTVs that is important and that requires explanation. At low CLTVs the effect of volatility on defaults is positive; but at high CLTVs the effect is negative and large. This seems counter-intuitive since option prices increase in volatility. The total number of defaults does increase as house price volatility increases; but it does not follow that the next period's default rate increases conditional on a given CLTV. An increase in volatility has two offsetting effects. First, the stopping boundary for house prices falls;
and secondly the probability of reaching this boundary increases. It is not obvious which effect will dominate a priori. Figure 1 shows that the effect of house price volatility depends on CLTV. When house price volatility is low and CLTV is high, optimal default occurs immediately since there is little benefit to waiting to see if house prices fall lower. 9 As house price volatility increases, however, the probability of default in the next period declines since expected house price changes make waiting more valuable (see .
Because most empirical data are heavily weighted with low CLTV loans, it is not surprising that empirical studies have found a positive relationship between house price volatility and mortgage default ( e.g., Schwartz and Torous 1993).
Our results, however, imply that the effect of house price volatility interacts with CLTV and is negative and large at high CLTVs.
Rental Rate
Figure 2 plots the effect of the rental rate on default probabilities. As with house price volatility, there is a sign reversal at high CLTV. The rental rate is analogous to the dividend rate on a stock. The effect of the rental rate should be similar to the effect of dividend yield on early exercise of an American put.
Again there are two offsetting effects. On the one hand, a higher rental rate implies a lower rate of appreciation of the property which increases the likelihood of hitting the default boundary sometime in the future. On the other hand, a high rental rate makes the existing mortgage payment more attractive relative to renting. When default is imminent, the borrower has an incentive to continue paying longer. The shorter the horizon and the higher the CLTV, the more likely the negative effect on defaults will dominate. Because of the offsetting effects and the small impact in all states as indicated in Figure 2 , the anticipated effect of the rental rate in empirical studies is small. Figure 3 illustrates that when spot interest rates increase from the level at origination, the computed default rate falls. If interest rates fall, however, there is little impact on default. At CLTVs close to one, the default rate actually declines slightly as interest rates fall. Figure 3 demonstrates that a positive interest rate spread variable is essential in empirical models that use BCLTV as the measure of CLTV. Notice also that the size of the interest rate effect is much greater at high CLTVs. An interaction term of interest rates with CLTV will be needed to capture the effect empirically.
Interest Rates
Interest Rate Volatility Figure 4 shows the effect of interest rate volatility on the probability of default.
The effect of volatility is ambiguous a priori because refinancings, which foreclose the default option, occur when rates fall. If rates rise, the value of the mortgage is reduced also leading to fewer defaults. When there is little or no equity in the house, however, default is a likely response to falling rates because the value of the high coupon loan increases and further reduces effective equity.
In panel A of Figure 4 , at low CLTVs, there is minimal effect on default probability. For high CLTVs (Panel C) increasing interest rate volatility slightly decreases the likelihood of default over the next year. As a result empirical studies may have difficulty distinguishing any statistically significant effect. Figure 5 indicates that the affect of the interest rate reversion parameter on next year's default probability is quite small and mostly positive. The stronger the reversion, the less likely a favorable interest rate environment will present itself, reducing the value of the default option and increasing the probability of default. The effect is more pronounced for high CLTV loans but still quite small.
Reversion Parameter
Transaction Costs of Default
Transactions costs are particularly interesting because they can vary in three ways. First, each individual faces different transactions costs from family and job characteristics. It is well known that single individuals are more likely to move than other household types. Second, transactions cost vary by location since the legal remedies available to lenders differ. In one-remedy states, borrowers can default with minimal consequences to their personal finances (Jones 1993) . Third, this cost can vary over time for the same individual when personal circumstances change. A divorce or job change can greatly reduce the cost of default since the borrower will need to move independently of the default decision. Ambrose et al. (1996) point out that transactions costs can even be negative for borrowers who may enjoy a period of free rent before foreclosure is completed. Figure 6 shows the effect of these transactions costs on default probabilities.
The impact on unconditional default is negative and modest in size at the 90%
CLTV. Transactions costs reduce conditional default probabilities at all
CLTVs but have their most dramatic impact at high CLTV (Panel C). This difference between the unconditional and conditional may account for some of the disagreement on the importance of transactions costs Kim 1993, Lekkas, Quigley and Van Order 1993) . The results suggest that for empirical models, transactions costs should be interacted with CLTV rather than included as a linear covariate.
Transactions Costs of Refinancing
The transactions costs of refinancing include origination fees, points and legal fees. Absent these costs, refinancing would be optimal whenever interest rates fall below the contract interest rate and borrower equity is positive. The model includes both fixed and variable transaction costs of refinancing. Figure 7 indicates that the short horizon default rate increases slightly as the transaction cost of refinance increases. Overall this variable has little effect on the default rate.
Trigger Events
Historically, industry analysts have assumed that exogenous events ( e.g., divorce or unemployment) play a major role in mortgage default. In our model, exogenous events are random events with a given probability of occurrence.
The borrower realizes that exogenous events may occur in the future, and adjusts his decisions to default or prepay today appropriately. We separate the defaults into those that are due to the optimal decision at the time, and those which are a response to an exogenous event. This allows computation of the probability that an exogenous event will cause a default. In the base case, it is assumed that transaction costs are present for all default decisions. In many cases, however, an exogenous event may result in several changes for the decision maker -some of which may reduce the transactions costs of defaulting to zero. For example, if a move results from this exogenous event (perhaps a change of employment location), then the moving costs of default are no longer relevant to the decision. For this reason, a modified model is also analyzed when transaction costs are zero if the exogenous event occurs.
The results are summarized in Table 2 . The exogenous termination rate is set to 9%, and the default rates are those occurring over the next year. The first two columns provide the results for the normal transactions cost cases; the second two assume that transactions costs fall to zero when the trigger event occurs.
For each transactions cost assumption results for 90% and 110% LTVs are included. The most useful comparison is between total defaults (line 2) and defaults given that a trigger event has occurred. In the first two columns the default rate given a trigger event is the same or lower than the overall rate.
That is, borrowers are no more likely to default with a trigger event than without.
In the second two columns when transactions costs are assumed to fall to zero if a trigger event occurs, borrowers do default at a higher rate. For the 90% LTV the default rate rises from .75% to 4% with the trigger events and for 110% LTV the defaults rise from 66% to 75%. That is, if the trigger event reduces transactions costs to zero, borrowers are more likely to default. The increase is relatively large in the low LTV range where a significant proportion of the total defaults (35%) can be attributed to the trigger events. However since most defaults occur at high LTVs and since only 4% of the defaults can be attributed to trigger events in this range, trigger events cannot be the primary cause of defaults.
Optimal default (and prepayment) is the first choice available to the borrower.
If the borrower does not default or prepay; then, an exogenous event may present itself. When an outsider observes both a default and an exogenous event, he may assume that the "trigger event" caused the default, rather than the default occurring as an optimal decision in the same period a trigger event occurs. The default should not be credited to the trigger event, unless the event occurs only because of the trigger event. Our overall conclusion, is that trigger events play a minor role 10 . If house prices are low (precipitating high CLTVs) defaults will be high, regardless of whether trigger events occur or not. Figure   8 illustrates the minor impact on default as the exogenous termination rate is varied.
Measuring Current Loan to Value Ratios in Empirical Studies
Current loan to value (CLTV) is the current value of the loan divided by the current value of the house. Book CLTV (BCLTV) is the contractual balance on the note divided by the current house value. Market CLTV (MCLTV) is defined to be the market value of the loan divided by the current house value.
BCLTV is easily computed as long as the initial loan parameters and current house prices are available. BCLTV explicitly allows for the amortization of the mortgage and changing house prices. However, it does not account for the effect of interest rates on current loan values. For example, when interest rates rise, the market value of a mortgage falls. The market CLTV will fall while the book CLTV is unaffected. The change in market value will enter the borrower's decision calculus. This suggests that MCLTV may be a better measure for default analysis. There are three ways to deal with the difference between BCLTV and MCLTV in empirical analysis:
Use simple ad hoc rules for computing MCLTV. Foster and Van Order (1984) , recognizing that BCLTV and MCLTV can diverge when interest rates change, propose estimating the economic value of the mortgage by discounting the remaining payments at the current interest rate and assuming repayment after 40% of its remaining contractual life. This approach is simple and efficient to implement but may be biased. We explore the possible bias below. Panel B, with results for CLTV=1, also illustrates a similar trend, though the FVO predicted default rate is lower when the spot rate is above 11%. In the 8½% -9½% range, however, the contingent claims model waits to see if refinance will be the best choice while the FVO approach chooses immediate refinance. For CLTV =1.1 the FVO approach chooses immediate default if spot rates are 10.5% or lower, while the model does not choose immediate default unless the spot rate is 9 percent or lower. For interest rates above 11%, the projected default rate in the model is higher, suggesting that the FVO model over corrects for interest rate changes.
This over correction has been confirmed empirically by Capozza, Kazarian and Thomson (1997) , and by Cooperstein, Redburn, and Myers (1991) . The reason for this result is that the in the model, the interest rate process is mean reverting.
11 This is not exactly the same as assuming that no adjustment to the perceived mortgage value is needed since the model evaluates the potential of a refinance if interest rates fall. If the FVO assumption of no adjustment is used, refinance will never be chosen regardless of how low interest rates fall since there are costs to refinance yet there would be no computed benefit.
If the interest rate rises, it will naturally tend toward its mean. The FVO adjustment, on the other hand, assumes the higher interest rate will prevail until the mortgage is paid off. When the base model is run with a smaller reversion parameter, the results are closer to the FVO version.
Use MCLTV in empirical analysis.
An Figure 9 illustrates the computed default rate over the next year as MCTLV is varied by adjusting the mortgage coupon rate from rates below the spot rate to coupon rates above the spot rate.
Three cases are presented for spot rates of 5%, 10% and 15%. If MCTLV is sufficient for assessing default, then all lines should plot on top of each other (i.e., for a given MCLTV the default rates will be equal). Instead, the default rate over most of the range of the graph increases as the coupon rate rises.
In general, if the coupon rate is high relative to the spot rate, default becomes more likely. However, near an MCLTV = 1 the default rate falls because refinancing, which extinguishes the default option, becomes increasingly likely.
MCLTV changes most in response to house price changes or interest rate changes. Near an MCLTV of one, with default imminent, as spot interest rates fall, the probability of default first rises because borrowers are increasingly unhappy with the existing high coupon rate. However, if rates continue to fall and the borrower has equity in the house, the borrower will refinance and extinguish the default option. If the loan is "under water" however, an alternate response will be to default. For the same measured MCLTV, one observes in one case more defaults, and the other sharply fewer. MCLTV is not a sufficient statistic. Thus, despite the sophisticatin of MCLTV, it still is not ideal for empirical analysis.
Use BCLTV but properly include other covariates in empirical models to adjust for the changes in the model parameters.
A third alternative is to include other variables, like the coupon rate, in empirical models to mitigate any shortcomings of BCLTV. This approach to measuring CLTV also has its advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it is simple and efficient to implement; but on the other hand, care must be taken to include the relevant variables. The analysis above suggests that using BCLTV in conjunction with other variables can be an effective alternative to using ad hoc rules.
Conclusions and Empirical Implications
This paper has developed a contingent claims model of mortgage default and applied the model to obtain insights for empirical modeling. There are four types of results. First, some variables suggested by options pricing matter unconditionally but are secondary or tertiary in importance conditionally.
These include the rental rate, interest rate volatility and interest rate reversion.
Second, some effects reverse signs under certain conditions. These include most notably house price volatility, but also the rental rate and interest rate volatility. The sign reversal for volatility from positive to negative occurs when the default option is in the money (high CLTV). In this range, volatility causes borrowers to delay default in anticipation of the possibility of more favorable exercise conditions in the future. This result contrasts with the unconditional probability which is positively affected by volatility. The borrower's problem at each time is to determine which action provides the lowest discounted housing cost. In other words, just prior to a mortgage payment due date, the mortgagor assesses whether it less costly to default, to refinance, or to make the scheduled mortgage payment. This decision can be written as:
(A1) where
P d t (H t ,r t ) = H t + TC (A2)
= Pmt + (1+X) MB t + F (A3) and
P w t (H t ,r t ) = [p u q u P t+1 (u H t , r u ) + (1-p u )q u P t+1 (d H t , r u ) + p u (1-q u ) P t+1 (u H t , r d ) + (1-p u )(1-q u ) P t+1 (d H t , r d )] δ t + Pmt.
(A4) where
P d t (H t ,r t )
= the value of the house plus the transaction costs, which is the value of the loan (to the mortgagor) if he chooses to default on the loan now,
TC
= transactions costs of default,
P r t (H t ,r t )
= is the cost to obtain a fair value new mortgage, which is the value if one refinances the mortgage now. The lender receives a fair exchange mortgage for providing the funds to refinance the mortgage balance. The nature of the new loan is not specified. The new loan could be a non-prepayable, or prepayable, a fixed or variable rate loan, etc. The only requirement here is that it is fairly priced so that it is equal to the mortgage balance that must be refinanced. The deadweight cost of a new mortgage includes any excess points (X) that are not priced in the mortgage instrument itself, and a fixed fee (F). Dunn and Spatt (1986) emphasize the importance of the mortgage refinancing costs on refinancing decisions, and on the value of the mortgage.
In particular they note that prepayable mortgages may trade at values above par when it is not advantageous for a mortgagor to refinance in response to a small interest rate decrease due to the transaction costs of refinance. In the absence of refinance costs, any decrease in interest rates would lead to refinance. X = deadweight refinancing costs that are a function of the loan size (e.g. the commonly used one point origination fee for a mortgage), F = deadweight fixed refinancing cost ( e.g. cost of a property survey or credit check),
MB t
= the mortgage balance at time t,
Pmt
= the monthly mortgage payment, P w t (H t ,r t ) = the present value of the loan assuming the decision maker makes the contractual mortgage payment and thus continues the mortgage at least one more period. This is the expected discounted future value of the loan given that the house price and interest rate changes next period according to the processes noted.
δ t = the one period discount factor for the current spot interest rate.
The model is revised to allow for events which are exogenous to the optimizing decision as described thus far. These events cause premature termination of the mortgage, in the sense that when it is not otherwise optimal to choose to default or prepay, an exogenous event may precipitate one of these decisions. The exogenous event is assumed to follow the pattern established by the PSA 13 function though it may be scaled by a chosen multiple. When an exogenous event occurs, the decision maker decides whether it is better to prepay or to default by simply assessing what is best at this instant as there is no future to be considered. The best choice is the minimum cost choice -either to pay off the mortgage balance, or to default if the house price plus transaction costs of default are lower than the mortgage balance. Equation (A1) is modified to allow for exogenous events as:
( A5) where:
λ t = the exogenous event rate at period t.
To complete the model one must specify the appropriate boundary condition at maturity. In the final period, the wait choice vanishes. The value of the mortgage, if default is chosen, is the value of the house plus transactions costs. The alternative is to payoff the mortgage by making the final payment.
The mortgagor chooses the lower cost alternative, which in general is to make the final mortgage payment. The mortgagor will make the final mortgage payment if the transaction cost of default exceeds the mortgage payment. The boundary equation at maturity is:
P T (H T , r T ) = Min{H T + TC , Pmt}.
13 The PSA model is the prepayment model produced by the Public Securities Association which projects the prepayment rate as rising linearly from 0 to 6% per annum over the first 30 months of the loan and then remaining at 6% per annum for the remainder of the loan. The monthly PSA model of prepayments can be written as: 2, 3, . . ., 29 λ t = 0.005 t = 30, 31, 32, . . ., 360. Solving for the optimal decision sequence and values is by backward induction starting with equation (A6) and working to the present. It is not appropriate to prepay a mortgage the instant it is taken out (one would wait at least one month in this discrete time model) and one does not make a payment on a mortgage until the first month. The value of a mortgage at initiation is thus the present value of the mortgage one period from now less a payment which need not be made at initiation:
The model is appropriate for determining the optimal decision at each stage (time period) and for computing the value of the loan. The primary purpose of this modeling, however, is to learn about default probabilities, which requires the use of lattice process probabilities to compute projected default rates. Because default at any stage is conditional on what has happened in the past, this computation is made as a forward recursion on the lattice using the optimal default and prepayment boundaries as stopping points for the process. While hedging arguments provide that the default option, and optimal stopping boundary are determined using the risk neutralized house price process of equation (2), determining the probability of default is done using the actual house price process of equation (1). To implement the computation of the default probabilities, the probability of an upstate in house prices is computed using the same CRR equation, but with the gross return to housing used in place of the risk free interest rate, that is:
π u = actual probability of an upstate = exp [(g-γ) 
Operationally, the model is run; and the optimal default and prepayment hitting boundaries are stored.
Then starting with a probability of 1 from the initial node, the probability of reaching each interest rate and house price node in the next period is computed. If that node involves a prepayment, the probability of reaching that node is credited to the probability of a prepayment, and then the probability of that node is set to zero. A similar approach is used for default nodes. For nodes for which neither a prepayment or default is chosen, their probability is reduced by the exogenous termination rate. The exogenous event probability is credited to either prepayment or default, depending on whether the mortgage balance exceeds the house value plus transaction cost of default. The process is then continued for another stage. The correct conditional probabilities are computed because nodes where a default or prepayment has occurred have their probability set to zero, so forward movements from these nodes are made with zero probability. The probability of default at each stage is computed by summing the probabilities of all default nodes at that stage. Figure 1 . The effect of house price volatility. The three panels of this figure depict the effect of house price volatility on default for a 5 year old mortgage and three BCLTVs. Base case parameters are given in Table 1 . Solid line is the default probability for the next year and the dashed line for the next 10 years. The three panels of this figure show the effect of the rent-to-price ratio on default for a 5 year old mortgage and three BCLTVs. Base case parameters are given in Table 1 . Solid line is the default probability for the next year and the dashed line for the next 10 years. The three panels of this figure illustrate the effect of interest rate changes since origination on default for a 5 year old mortgage and three BCLTVs. Base case parameters are given in Table 1 . Solid line is the default probability for the next year and the dashed line for the next 10 years. The three panels of this figure present the effect of interest rate volatility on default for a 5 year old mortgage and three BCLTVs. Base case parameters are given in Table 1 . Solid line is the default probability for the next year and the dashed line for the next 10 years. The three panels of this figure show the effect of interest rate reversion on default for a 5 year old mortgage and three BCLTVs. Base case parameters are given in Table 1 . Solid line is the default probability for the next year and the dashed line for the next 10 years. The three panels of this figure illustrate the effect of default-related transactions costs on default probabilities for a 5 year old mortgage and three BCLTVs. Base case parameters are given in Table  1 . Solid line is the default probability for the next year and the dashed line for the next 10 years. The three panels of this figure depict the effect of deadweight refinancing costs on default for a 5 year old mortgage and three BCLTVs. Base case parameters are given in Table 1 . Solid line is the default probability for the next year and the dashed line for the next 10 years. The three panels of this figure show the effect of exogenous terminations on default for a 5 year old mortgage and three BCLTVs. Base case parameters are given in Table 1 . Solid line is the default probability for the next year and the dashed line for the next 10 years. 
Figure 9. MCLTV and Default
The figure plots the default probability over the next year for three spot interest rates as market current loan to value varies for a 5 year old loan and for a book current loan to value ratio = 1.0. Model parameters are as given in Table 1 with the following exceptions: i) House value = loan balance = $100,000; ii) Mortgage coupon rate varied from about 2% below indicated spot rate to 2% above indicated spot rate to vary the market current loan to value. The figure illustrates that MCLTV does not fully capture the effect of interest rate changes on default. The three panels of this figure illustrate the effect of interest rate changes since origination on default for a 5 year old mortgage and three BCLTVs. Base case parameters are given in Table 1 . Solid line is the default probability for the next year and the dashed line for the next 10 years. Dots on lines represent the FVO analysis. 
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